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STRIKES AND IMPASSE RESOLUTION 
IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
Arvid Anderson* 
I. INTRODUCTION: A VIEW FROM NEW YORK CITY 
NINETEEN sixty-eight was the year of the strike in public employ-ment. The New York City sanitation strike, the tragic strike 
of sanitation workers in Memphis, and the New York City teachers' 
strikes were the most dramatic public employee disputes of 1968, 
but there were many less publicized strikes with significant local 
impacts in all parts of the country. The number and effect of these 
disputes-particularly in New York City1-crystallized the political 
positions of many candidates in municipal, state, and national elec-
tions;2 candidates, newspaper editors, and government administrators 
• Chairman, New York City Office of Collective Bargaining. B.A. 1946, LL.B. 1948, 
University of Wisconsin.-Ed. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of 
Mr. Robert J. Pleasura, Legal Assistant in the New York City Office of Collective 
Bargaining, who contributed a great deal to this Article, particularly to the discussions 
of economics and the foreign experience. 
1. The following table is illustrative: 
Year Strikes No. Workers Man-days idle 
New York City 
1968 8• 69,800 1,930,000b 
1967 10 63,900 785,000 
1966 9 40,000 291,500 
1965 3 6,750• 118,000 
1964 3 2,460 5,460 
New York State 
1968 8· 800 7,360 
1967 5 64 9,000 
1966 6 70 2500 
1965 1 _d 
1964 1 20 30 
a. Tentative 1968 figures, do not include consideration of the New York State De-
partment of Mental Hygiene Strike. 
b. Teachers-1,860,000 man-days idle; 
Sanitation-60,000 man-days idle. 
c. Welfare-6,500 workers involved. 
d. Fewer than 1,000. 
1964-1966 figures from New York State Department of Labor, Division of Research and 
Statistics, Work Stoppages in New York State. Figures for 1967-1968 and January to 
December 1, 1968, were supplied by Jack Herbst, Division of Research and Statistics, 
New York State Department of Labor. 
2. During the New Hampshire Republican Presidential Primary, Richard Nixon 
backed Mayor Lindsay's firm position during the sanitation strike and supported the 
mayor's request for National Guard intervention. The President advocated strict 
compliance with state legislation and was disappointed with Governor Rockefeller's 
willingness to assist negotiations during an illegal strike. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1968, at 
33, col. 2. 
Senatorial Candidate Paul O'Dwyer, counsel for the Sanitation Union, recommended 
suitable alternatives to the strike: "You cannot take away a public employee's right to 
[943] 
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for the most part expressed dismay at the work stoppages and at 
the acts of civil disobedience which often accompanied them. 
The increase in the incidence of public sector strikes may be 
explained in part by the extraordinarily rapid increase in the extent 
of unionization among government employees. In New York State, 
for example, more than 750,000 workers-nearly three fourths of 
all public employees in the state-are now organized.3 In New York 
City alone, more than ninety-five per cent of those city workers em-
ployed by municipal agencies which are not headed by mayoral 
appointees are represented by some labor organization, although 
the percentage of actual union membership is not that great.4 
Legislatures in a growing number of states have contributed 
to the increase in public sector unionization by passing comprehen-
sive statutes which recognize the right of public employees to 
organize and bargain collectively;5 other states have enacted en-
abling legislation which establishes collective bargaining rights for 
selected public employee groups.6 None of these statutes recognizes 
the right of all public employees to strike. 
It should never have been supposed, however, that a mere pro-
hibition on the right to strike contained in a statute conferring 
bargaining rights would mean the demise of public employee work 
strike unless you give him something in its place." N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1968, at 42, 
col. 4. Senator Jacob Javits recommended binding arbitration in public employment 
labor disputes. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1968, at 39, col. 1. The New York Times sum-
marized editorials supporting strict compliance with the Taylor Law. This summary 
included opinions from the Buffalo Evening News, The Rochester Democrat & Chron-
icle, The Chicago American, The New York Daily News, and the Suffolk Sun. N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 2, 1968, at 38. 
It is said that John DeLury, Jr., President of the New York City Uniformed Sanita-
tion Workers Association, does not support strike action by public employees: "He 
doesn't believe in strikes by public employees (his union has really had only one 
major strike in its history, in 1968), but rather that their legitimate objectives should 
be achieved through political activity." Costikyan, Who Runs New York?, THE NEW 
YORK MAGAZINE, Dec. 23, 1968, at 25. 
3. Hearing on Taylor Law Before the Joint Legislatfoe Comm. on Indus. and 
Labor Conditions, at 3 (New York State Dec. 18, 1968) (statement by Mr. Robert D. 
Helsby on behalf of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board). 
4. This high degree of organization in New York City reflects a long-standing 
policy of the city government to encourage unionization and collective bargaining 
among its employees. Mayor Wagner's Executive Order No. 49, issued in 1958, encour-
aged collective bargaining by employees appointed by the mayor. See also New York 
City Collective Bargaining Law, N.Y. CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CooE ch. 54, Local Law 53 §§ 
1170.0-74.0(b), reproduced in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 205, at E-1. 
5. For a list of these statutes, see Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Pub-
lic Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REv. 891, 
892 n.5 (1969). 
6. E.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111%, § 328a (1967) (metropolitan transit employees); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:890 (Supp. 1969) (public transport workers); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 26, § 980-92 (Supp. 1968) (fire fighters); Mo. ANN. CooE art. 64B, §§ 7(s), 14(d) 
(1968) (metropolitan transit authority); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 to -273 (1967) (fire 
fighters). 
March 1969] Strikes and Impasse Resolution 945 
stoppages. Indeed, the experience in Michigan following the passage 
of its Public Employment Relations Act7 suggests that, if anything, 
the introduction of collective bargaining rights to public employ-
ment in an already highly unionized state might cause an increase 
in work stoppages. In the first year under the Michigan act, there 
were twelve strikes by municipal employees; in the previous seven-
teen years there had been only thirteen.8 New York's Taylor Com-
mittee, drawing upon the earlier Michigan experience, anticipated 
that the immediate impact of its proposed statewide mandate to 
grant exclusive recognition and bargaining rights to public employee 
unions in New York might be to increase the number of illegal 
strikes.0 Still, the public, which had hoped that the new Taylor 
Law10 would bring labor peace to the public sector, was not prepared 
for the rash of strikes that ensued. Governor Rockefeller, in his an-
nual message to the 1969 New York legislature, declared that the Tay-
lor Law "is not a perfect instrument. Judged solely on its ability to 
prevent such stoppage, it is indeed imperfect."11 Yet, it would be mis-
leading to conclude from the experience in Michigan and New York 
that the way to prevent public sector strikes is to abolish laws which 
confer bargaining rights on public employees. Major public em-
ployee strikes have also occurred in many states without such laws. 
Teachers struck in Florida, policemen in Ohio, firemen in Georgia, 
and hospital workers in Illinois; none of these states has a statute 
similar to the Taylor Law. 
In a growing number of states there seems to be tacit recognition 
that public sector collective bargaining is here to stay; the ultimate 
question is what to do about the strike issue. Is collective bargaining 
in public employment possible without the right to strike? Given 
strong political pressures favoring labor peace, is it realistic to sup-
pose that we can adapt private sector collective bargaining techniques 
to normalize labor relations in government employment? Closely 
related to the debate over the right to strike is the debate over ap-
propriate sanctions: What can be done to avoid strikes or to termi-
nate those that do occur? In New York State, at least, the argument 
seems to center on whether the penalties for violation of no-strike 
laws should be increased. The Taylor Committee recently reiterated 
7. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1967) ("Hutchinson Act"). 
8. Rapoport, Militant Public Employees, Wall St. J., Aug. 9, 1966, at 14. 
9. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, Final 
Report 42-43, 53 (1966). 
IO. N.Y. CIV. SERv. L. §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The present version of 
this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective April l, 1969), appears 
in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).] 
11. THE CIDEF, THE NEW YoRK CITY CIVIL EMPLOYEES' WEEKLY, Jan. 17, 1969, at I. 
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its original pos1t10n in favor of unlimited fines against striking 
unions.12 In response to this proposal and other community pres-
sures,13 the New York legislature amended the Taylor Law on March 
4, 1969, to provide for stiffer penalities against striking public em-
ployees and their unions.14 
The short history of unionism in the public sector demonstrates 
graphically that merely declaring public employee strikes illegal 
12. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT No. 282, at B-1 (Feb. 13, 1969) [here-
inafter GERR]. 
13. The Citizens' Budget Commission, a New York City nonprofit taxpayer group, 
criticized the $10,000 ceiling on the daily fine which could be imposed against a strik• 
ing union under the original version of the Taylor Law. The Commission also pre• 
£erred an indeterminate jail sentence to the thirty-day-maximum sentence then 
available for union leaders who urged disobedience of an injunction. New York City 
Citizens' Budget Commission, Is New York Governable?, Nov. 24, 1968 (mimeo). A 
spokesman for the Commerce and Industry Association of New York recommended 
that a union which violates the strike ban loses its dues deduction privilege for an 
unlimited period. GERR No. 274, at B-5. Under the original Taylor Law, a union in 
violation of the antistrike provision loses the privilege for no more than eighteen 
months. Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, ch. 392, § 210(£), [1967] N.Y. Laws 
1102. 
14. The amendments call for unlimited fines against striking unions and the loss 
of dues check-off privileges for unlimited periods. Another section provides for the 
loss of two days pay for each day a public employee is on strike. Moreover, a striking 
worker is subject to one year's probation with loss of tenure for any violation of the 
strike prohibition. For the text of the law as amended, see GERR No. 288, at F-1 
(March 17, 1969). 
A number of other amendments were also pending before the New York Legislature. 
S. 1207 was introduced January 14, 1969, by Senator Rollison to amend the Civil 
Service Law and the Judiciary Law to repeal the limitation of penalty for a striking 
union. To replace the provision providing for a fine equal to 1/52d of total annual 
dues of the organization or $10,000, whichever is lesser, it provided that the method 
of calculation of the fine would be equal to $100 multiplied by the number of mem-
bers or $10,000, whichever is greater. Senator Rollison also introduced S. 1206, Jan• 
uary 14, 1969. Its purpose was to amend the Civil Service Law in order to permit a 
taxpayer's suit in the nature of a special proceeding in the Appellate Division of the 
New York Supreme Court against a striking public employee organization in cases 
where the chief legal officer fails, within ten days after the commencement of such 
strike, to apply to that court for an injunction. It might be asked whether the N.Y. 
CIV. PRAc. §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963) proceeding in the nature of mandamus is not 
an adequate remedy. 
S. 2168, introduced by Senators Balletta and Jonas, January 20, 1969, would amend 
the Civil Service Law to require a no-strike pledge of every public employee and a 
penalty for violation consisting of forfeiture of all rights of tenure, accumulated sick 
leave and vacation time, and that portion of the pension fund which has been paid 
by the employer. Furthermore, dismissal of striking public employees would be 
mandatory. On the same date, Senators Balletta and Jonas also introduced S. 2170 
to provide for the appointment by the governor of seven public-spirited citizens to 
act as arbitrators. S. 2170 would also resolve impasses by final referral to compulsory 
arbitration by the named governor's panel. Any person found guilty of refusing to 
implement or obey the panel's decision could be found in contempt, fined $500, im-
prisoned 60 days, or both. 
In addition, the second interim report of the governor's "Taylor Panel" recom-
mended that limits on fines for the contempt convictions of public employee union 
leaders be repealed. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of 
New York, Second Interim Report 18 Gan. 23, 1969). 
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will prevent neither collective bargaining from developing nor 
strikes from occurring. At all levels of government, legislatures, 
executives, and the courts have been forced to deal with the problem. 
But they can no longer afford the luxury of debate about what the 
public policy toward public employee strikes should be; rather, they 
must deal realistically with a situation in which strikes-although 
illegal-remain a constant possibility. In this regard it is submitted 
that the existence of collective bargaining in the public sector does 
not depend upon a resolution of public policy concerning the strike 
issue. For amidst all of the outcry about public employee strikes, 
the fact remains that a great many collective bargaining contracts 
are concluded without strikes. New York City, for instance, is obli-
gated to deal with more than eighty unions in approximately 170 dif-
ferent collective bargaining relationships. The vast majority of these 
negotiations are resolved without a strike or the threat of a strike.15 In 
those instances in which impasse panels have been appointed under 
the city's collective bargaining statute,16 the city and the public em-
ployee organizations involved have accepted the recommendations. 
At the state level, of 370 impasses that were referred to the New York 
Public Employer Relations Board (PERB) in its first year of opera-
tion, only five cases (which involved a total of fewer than 1,700 em-
ployees) resulted in work stoppages. Although there were nine other 
work stoppages in the state during that year, in those instances the im-
passe procedures of the Taylor Law were not utilized.17 The experi-
ence in other states which have adopted public sector collective bar-
gaining laws is similar; countless contracts have been negotiated with-
out strikes or the threat of strikes. But strikes, when they do occur, 
make the headlines because of their great political-if not economic 
-impact on the public. 
Experience indicates that in most instances the right to strike is 
not an essential part of the public employment collective bargaining 
process.18 Thus, the crucial issue is not really whether strikes should 
be permitted or prohibited in the public sector, but whether the col-
lective bargaining process itself can be made so effective absent the 
right to strike that the need for work stoppages will be obviated. It is 
my conclusion that certain proven impasse resolution procedures-
mediation, fact-finding, and in some cases, even arbitration-can be 
15. More than one hundred agreements were negotiated in 1968 between the City 
of New York and its municipal unions. THE CHIEF, THE NEW Yonx. CITY CIVIL EM· 
l'LOYEES' WEEKLY, Jan. 17, 1969, at 4. 
16. For the text of the statute, see GERR No. 205, at E-1 (Aug. 14, 1967). 
17. Hearing, supra note 3, at 7. 
18. But see Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 931, 941 (1969). 
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substitued for the strike weapon in public employment without sub-
stantial loss in the effectiveness of collective bargaining as it is known 
in the private sector. If this is in fact the case, it will be unnecessary 
for state legislatures to resolve the difficult policy dispute over 
whether public employees should be given the right to strike. Still, it 
may be useful to examine the arguments for and against the right to 
strike in public employment in order to evaluate the various pro-
posals for making public sector collective bargaining orderly and 
effective. 
II. THE RIGHT To STRIKE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THEORETICAL 
AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The debate over the right to strike in public employment has 
tended to center around two polar extremes. On the one hand, some 
argue that public employees should have an unequivocal right to 
strike.19 Others contend that strikes in the public sector must be pro-
hibited in all circumstances. However, to present the issue in such 
stark black and white terms is to miss the point that there is a viable 
middle position. Those who favor the right to strike seem to take 
the position that true collective bargaining depends upon a balanced 
power relationship between the negotiating parties. They assume 
that, absent the strike weapon, public employees would not have 
sufficient power with which to achieve real bargaining leverage. In 
support of this assumption, they state that the right to strike has 
been the equalizer in employer-employee relations for one third of a 
century in private employment collective bargaining and that the 
transfer of private sector collective bargaining procedures into the 
public sector must necessarily be accompanied by the strike weapon 
as it is known in the private sector.20 
But this position, if taken literally, tends to overlook the fact 
that there is no such thing as an unlimited right to strike in private 
employment. The Congress, state legislatures, and the courts have for 
many years prescribed limitations on the right to strike; occasionally 
legislatures have enacted emergency provisions to delay strikes or 
prevent them altogether when necessary to protect the public's 
health, safety, and welfare.21 The right to strike has never been 
equated with any constitutional guarantee. Moreover, restrictions 
on concerted work stoppages do not raise an issue of involuntary 
19. See, e.g., id. at 940-41. 
20. See, e.g., id. at 941-42. 
21. E.g., Pub. L. No. 90-54, 81 Stat. 122 (1967) (special resolution and mediation of 
dispute under Railway Labor Act). 
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servitude. The courts have always interpreted the constitutional 
provisions on involuntary servitude as running to the individual; 
they have never found that these provisions extend so far as to create 
a collective right to terminate employment.22 
Indeed, those who advocate the right to strike in public employ-
ment usually make it clear that they are not actually calling for an 
unqualified or an unlimited right. Instead, they argue that lifting 
the strike ban in public employment labor disputes and granting 
a qualified right to strike in nonessential public services would move 
the parties toward more equal collective bargaining power and 
greater labor peace. Various legal mechanisms to distinguish between 
essential and nonessential government services have been suggested. 
Some of these provide for prior settlement of the issue of essential-
ity.23 Other mechanisms contemplate modes of emergency dispute 
resolution in which conditions after a strike has begun determine 
the essentiality of a service in terms of the community's health, 
safety, and welfare.24 The Pennsylvania Governor's Commission, for 
instance, would confer the right to strike only after the exhaustion 
of mediation and fact-finding procedures, and then only if a strike 
would not endanger the public's health, safety, and welfare.25 The 
right to strike, as envisioned by the Pennsylvania Commission, would 
not apply to policemen and firemen, who would be prohibited from 
striking by a compulsory arbitration provision.26 
22. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926). 
23. E.g., Public Service Staff Relations Act, ch. 72, § I0I(l)(c), [1966-67] Can. Stat.; 
se:e Arthurs, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada: Bold Experi-
me:nt or Act of Folly, 67 MrcH. L. REv. 971, 988-89 (1969). 
24. Quebec Civil Service Act, ch. 14, § 75, [1965] Que. Stat. (vol. 1) 157. Albert 
Shanker, President of the United Federation of Teachers, in proposing an end to the 
blanket New York State strike ban, suggested that it would be the best public policy 
to make a determination of essentiality only after a strike revealed the essential nature 
of the public service involved. GERR No. 276, at B-5 (Dec. 23, 1968). See text accom-
panying notes 29-31 infra. 
25. Governor's Commission To Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania, 
Report and Recommendations 14 (1968). 
26. This proposal was subsequently embodied in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 
1969), The increase in the incidence of public employee strikes affecting essential 
services has made the idea of compulsory arbitration seem more attractive-or at least 
less objectionable-as an alternative method of dispute resolution in the public sec-
tor. For instance, virtually no one would suggest that policemen should have the 
right to strike, and arbitration has been accepted as an alternative in an increasing 
number of states. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-3-8 to -II (1967) (advisory arbitration of 
municipal firemen disputes); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. III-213, § 301-44 (1967) (Chicago 
Transit Authority Employees); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:890 (Supp. 1969) (public 
transportation and municipal employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 980-92 
(Supp. 1968) (fire fighters); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 213.1-.16 (1947) (arbitration of 
public utility disputes); Fire Fighters' Arbitration Act, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.1-1 
to -14 (1969); Policemen's Arbitration Act, R.I. GEN. LAws Ann. §§ 28-9.2-1 to -14 (1969); 
School Teachers' Arbitration Act, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1 to -16 (1969); 
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Theodore Kheel, the able and experienced mediator of public 
employment disputes, has suggested a plan which would protect the 
community from "strikes that imperil the health and safety of the 
people," but which would still permit public employees to resort to 
the strike in other situations.27 Under this plan, modeled after the 
emergency provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, the disputing parties 
would be subject to a cooling-off period during which they would 
be expected to continue bargaining. In the event that the dispute 
was not settled during the eighty-day cooling-off period, compul-
sory arbitration or indefinite postponement of the strike would still 
be available. Mr. Kheel maintains the hope that "resort to this 
machinery need seldom be required especially if we seek affirma-
tively to improve the practice of collective bargaining."28 
Similarly, Albert Shanker, President of the New York City 
United Federation of Teachers, has suggested that although "society 
has a right to protect itself" against walkouts which endanger the 
public health and safety, many government services are nonessen-
tial.29 Accordingly, only those strikes that are a genuine threat to the 
public should be banned. The decision as to whether a particular 
service is nonessential should be left to a "top official or the courts," 
or to an impartial public agency.30 Mr. Shanker insists that the 
decision on the essentiality of a service cannot be made in advance 
of a strike because in each case there are varying factual circumstances 
that go to show essentiality or nonessentiality. In cases in which a 
service is deemed essential, Mr. Shanker acknowledges that "sanc-
tions" short of a strike would be the only available union weapon.31 
These proposals for a qualified right to strike, while theoretically 
appealing, present some difficult practical problems. For one thing, 
the ultimate resolution of public policy toward the strike issue is 
likely to affect the private as well as the public sector because it is 
difficult to distinguish between essential public and private services. 
Municipal Employees' Arbitration Act, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1 to -19 (1969); 
WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-265 to -273 (1967) (fire fighters). The New York City sanitation 
strike of 1968 was resolved in the end by final and binding arbitration. Indeed, the 
New York City Citizens Budget Commission had proposed that a system of compulsory 
arbitration replace the fact-finding procedure that presently exists under the Taylor 
Law. New York City Citizens' Budget Commission, Is New York Governable?, Nov. 24, 
1968 (mimeo). 
27. Kheel, Report to Speaker Anthony J. Travia on the Taylor Law, with a Pro• 
posed Plan to Prevent Strikes by Public Workers, 2 (Feb. 21, 1968); Kheel, supra note 
18, at 941. 
28. Kheel, Report, supra note 27, at 32. 
29. GERR No. 276, at B-5. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
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Resolution of this problem is in turn complicated by the fact that 
federal law protects the right to strike in private employment, while 
public employment disputes are a matter for state regulation. The 
impact of certain critical disputes in the private sector has recently 
raised the question whether the NLRA machinery is adequate to 
deal with local emergencies. For example, during the strike against 
Consolidated Edison Company in the New York City area, the New 
York City Corporation Counsel considered whether the emergency 
procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act could be applied.32 A strike by 
fuel oil drivers resulted in the declaration by the Emergency Con-
trol Board of the City of New York that the city was in a state of 
imminent peril. The strike, which occurred during the midst of a 
flu epidemic, brought severe hardships to apartment dwellers, home 
owners, and hospital patients.33 Thus, any test which purports to 
relate the right to strike to the essentiality of the service involved 
cannot operate to prohibit strikes in the public sector alone; the 
private sector also provides countless vital services affecting the 
health and safety of the public. A determination of essentiality might 
easily be made in advance with respect to police and fire services, 
but it would be difficult to categorize many other situations. 0£ 
course, the fact that making such determinations would be difficult 
for administrators and judges should not by itself cause us to discard 
the idea. After all, such determinations are frequently made under 
the Taft-Hartley Act in the private sector.34 
Still, the question remains whether the essential-services distinc-
tion is an equitable method for determining wage and employment 
policies in the public sector. This distinction puts a premium upon 
32. For a report of this strike, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1968, at 1, col. 7; Id., Dec. 8, 
1968, at 1 col. 8. 
33. N.Y. Post, Dec. 19, 1968, at I; editorial, N.Y. Post, Dec. 26, 1968, at 52; editorial, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1968, at 38, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1968, at I, col. 2. 
34. The experience under Taft-Hartley and under the Railway Labor Act has 
been critically examined in H. NORTHRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES: AN ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCE (1966). Northrup notes 
that between 1934 and June 30, 1964, 159 cases (35 of them involving airlines) were 
handled by emergency boards and 58 additional boards were selected from the Na-
tional Railway Labor Panel. Northrup's three major conclusions from this experience 
were: 
(I) The appointment of emergency boards had become commonplace; 
(2) recommendations of emergency boards at critical times have been handled 
with political expediency; and 
(3) the procedure has severely inhibited collective bargaining. 
Id. at 64. 
The criticisms of the Taft-Hartley emergency procedures at least recognize the 
problems associated with the administration of any emergency provisions. But, it is 
doubtful that the problem is intrinsic to the procedure as a whole. Our society is filled 
with all kinds of complex administrative problems and consideration of emergency 
procedures should not be discarded merely because their administration is difficult. 
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an employee group's capacity to injure the public: those employees 
with the greatest capacity to cause a disruption of public services 
will be able to exert considerable pressure by way of a strike, pro-
vided the disruption is difficult to predict; those employees whose 
services can occasionally be interrupted without serious conse-
quences will be given the right to strike precisely because it will 
give them little leverage. 
Whether the individual states will be willing to enact the sophis-
ticated labor relations legislation necessary to provide for the pro-
fessional administration of emergency procedures remains to be 
seen. It seems likely that such legislation, if it is enacted, will be 
confined to the larger states or will come from Congress. 
The advocates of a qualified right to strike in public employment 
generally recognize that state legislatures must provide the judiciary 
or some administrative official with the authority to fashion appro-
priate remedies for the violation of a limited strike prohibition. 
But fashioning realistic penalties for violations of strike prohibitions 
has proved to be an inordinately difficult task. In 1967 the New York 
State legislature repealed the rigid penalties of the Condon-Wadlin 
Law as unworkable.35 The Governor of Pennsylvania recently 
35. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of 
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). The law was invoked 
many times and injunctions were granted. New York City Transit Authority v. Quill, 48 
Misc. 2d 940, 266 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (transit employees); City of N.Y. v. 
Social Serv. Employees Union, 48 Misc. 2d 820, 266 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1965), afj'd, 
25 App. Div. 2d 953, 271 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966), motion granted, 18 N.Y.2d 675, 219 
N.E.2d 871, 273 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1966); Pruzan v. Board of Educ., 25 Misc. 2d 945, 209 
N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1960), afj'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 923, 215 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1961), afj'd, 
9 N.Y.2d 911, 176 N.E.2d 96, 217 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1961) (teachers); New York City Transit 
Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), afj'd, 3 App. Div. 
2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957) (transit employees). 
Attempts by taxpayers to enforce provisions of the act that applied to striking 
employees rather than to union leaders and union treasuries failed when the 
legislature excluded the particular group of employees from the penalty provisions. 
Weinstein v. New York City Transit Authority, 49 Misc. 2d 170, 267 N.Y.S.2d Ill 
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Law of July 6, 1966, chs. 807-08, [1966] N.Y. Laws 2292-93. The De-
partment of Marine and Aviation of New York City in 1967 sought to enforce pro• 
visions of the Condon-Wadlin Law against striking ferry operators. The case was 
remanded to determine the scope of the constitutional rights of the employees in-
volved and to determine if there had been a violation, since, in view of the recent 
exclusion of transit employees, there may have been a denial of equal protection of 
the law. In order to find a denial of equal protection, the court below would have had 
to hold that an intentional and insidious plan of discrimination against employees 
was being conducted by the Department of Marine and Aviation. A mere showing of 
nonenforcement as to some other city employees was not enough. "While the issue of 
constitutional rights was thus unsettled, the legislature acted to protect the ferry 
operators and the injunction forbidding officials from paying striking employees any 
amount in excess of their compensation prior to the strike was vacated. Employees 
who had been dismissed were rehired. DiMaggio v. Lindsay, 53 Misc. 2d 1036, 281 
N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. Ct. 1967). It was within this political climate that the Condon-Wadlin 
Act, Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of April 
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signed a teacher amnesty bill which enabled local school boards to 
grant pay increases to teachers who had participated in illegal 
strikes.36 A governor's study commission in that state pointed out 
that because of the difficulties of teacher recruitment, the prohibi-
tions against re-employment of striking teachers had worked to the 
disadvantage of several school districts which were forced to impose 
penalties; other communities were more than anxious to hire 
teachers who had been disciplined by denial of pay raises.37 Theim-
position of jail sentences against union leaders has done little more 
than provide them with an aura of martyrdom which has enhanced 
their prestige and job security. The practical necessity of bringing 
union leaders to the negotiating table in order to settle a strike led 
to delays in the sentencing process and persuasive requests for their 
early release from jail by the very authorities who prosecuted them. 
Furthermore, limited fines on some union treasuries have been too 
small to deter strike action; even a large fine is not excessively bur-
densome if it can be spread among the membership of a large union. 
And, as we have seen in New York City, individual and union fines 
may even be paid by other segments of the labor movement. Sum-
marizing these difficulties, it has been suggested that prohibitions of 
strikes will not survive in the American political climate if their 
maintenance depends primarily on the severity of the penalties for 
violation.38 
Those who argue against the right to strike for public employees 
point to the public sector collective bargaining laws which have been 
enacted to date by various states and municipalities.39 These statutes, 
all of which prohibit public employees from striking, are based on 
the conviction that the political process can be substituted for the 
strike weapon as an orderly method of dispute resolution. The ra-
tionale for this point of view is that decisions affecting the wages, 
hours, and working conditions of public employees are primarily 
political rather than economic. In short, public sector collective 
bargaining concerns the allocation of public resources: Which gov-
ernment employees receive how much of the tax revenues of various 
23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432, was repealed, effective Sept. I, 1967. In addi-
tion to the legal anomaly that appears in reported cases showing arbitrary exclusions 
from the act's penalty provisions, there were many cases where the provisions of the 
act were applicable but were not invoked at all. See Rosenzweig, The Condon-Wadlin 
A.ct Re-Examined, 9 INDUS. LAB. REL. REP. 5-7 (1965). 
36. GERR No. 277, B-2 (Dec. 30, 1968). 
37. Governor's Commission, supra note 25, at 14. 
38. Raskin, How To A.void Strikes by Garbagemen, Nurses, Teachers, Subwaymen, 
Welfare Workers, Etc., N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1968, § 6 (Magazine), at 34. 
39. See Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment Labor 
Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 891, 892 n.5 (1969). 
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governmental jurisdictions? Since this is a political matter, a system 
of political settlement is preferable to an impasse resolution mecha-
nism which depends upon economic coercion. Thus, some state legis-
latures have provided for fact-finding with recommendations as a 
substitute for the strike weapon.40 Other legislatures have provided 
for advisory arbitration and in some instances even compulsory 
arbitration as a method of dispute settlement.41 The theory behind 
these laws is that fact finders or arbitrators who are empowered to 
make recommendations, advisory awards, or final and binding deter-
minations will be able to provide an effective political substitute 
for the strike. The laws are also premised upon the assumption that 
the recommendations or decisions of neutral parties will be binding, 
or at least persuasive, to the body politic as well as to the unions, the 
employees, and the employing agencies involved. 
Opponents of the right to strike in the public sector point out 
that for many categories of nonessential public employees, the legis-
lative grant of the right to strike would be virtually meaningless un-
less work stoppages could be carried out in association with other 
groups of public employees engaged in more critical services. Pre-
serving the right to strike for librarians, custodians of cultural 
institutions, or tax collectors, for instance, is not likely to confer on 
such employees or their representatives a powerfu~ bargaining 
weapon. This observation is in no way intended to demean the 
importance of these public services; their interruption would ob-
viously be felt in due course. For example, payroll clerks and some 
computer operators would be missed on the very first payday, but a 
strike of tax collectors could last somewhat longer before the day of 
reckoning occured. Thus, the power of political persuasion through 
the utilization of fact-finding or arbitration accompanied by public 
recommendations is likely to be a much more effective balancing 
force for such employees than the strike. This argument is supported 
by the experience which some white-collar employees in the private 
sector have had with unionization. This experience demonstrates that 
collective bargaining based upon the right to stike and upon militant 
union activity has not been as effective a balancing force for white-
collar groups as it has been for blue-collar employees.42 
In light of the political nature of public employee bargaining, it 
is important to considei: whether the results of collective bargaining 
40. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.25 (1967); WIS. STAT. § 111.88 (1969). 
41. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.010 (1962) (compulsory); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24½, 
§ 38b3(3) (1964) (compulsory); MINN. STAT. §§ 179.36-.38 (1965) (compulsory); NEB. 
REv. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -823 (1960) (advisory). 
42. Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1969, at 1. 
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under laws which prohibit the strike would have been significantly 
different had the strike been legalized. First, in some emergency 
situations involving essential services, a strike would have to be en-
joined in any event. For instance, even if the strike of sanitation 
workers in New York City had been lawful initially, it is likely that 
an injunction would have been sought against the work stoppage 
on the ground that its prolongation constituted a health emer-
gency. Second, legalizing the strike might force some labor 
organizations to engage in a strike when they might not otherwise 
have done so in order to demonstrate to their membership that they 
have exhausted every possible avenue of dispute resolution. Finally, 
if public employee strikes were permitted, the attitude of govern-
ment employers toward collective negotiations might change drasti-
cally. The public employer would be forced to assume the role of a 
private employer in many situations: for instance, in order to balance 
its bargaining power against that of a strong union, the governmental 
unit might engage in a lockout if this could be done without dis-
rupting essential services. It might also attempt to break strikes by 
hiring replacements; if this is not feasible, the employing unit 
could initiate other lawful reprisals against striking employees. But 
it would be difficult as a practical matter for a public employer who 
has political responsibilities not shared by his counterparts in private 
employment to play this role. In the first place, supervisory employees 
are themselves highly organized in many jurisdictions; moreover, 
automation is less prevalent in public employment than in private 
industry. Both factors would make it particularly difficult for an 
employing agency to bring in replacements even in nonessential 
services. 
Legalizing the strike in the public sector would tend to increase 
the occasions for confrontation between the public employer and 
employee organizations. Public employee strikes increasingly involve 
disputes over social policy as well as over conditions of employment.43 
The recent teachers' strike in New York City, for instance, involved 
questions of decentralization and community control of schools; the 
dispute was not limited to economic benefits for teachers. Earlier 
strikes of welfare employees in New York City involved questions of 
the level of benefits to be made available to relief recipients. Resolu-
tion of such public policy questions has traditionally been the re-
sponsibility of the legislative and executive branches of government. 
4!1. Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in Public Edu-
cation: New York City's Changing Seven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1969); 
Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public Sch<;1ol Management, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
1017 (1969). 
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The scope of bargaining can, of course, be limited by statute to re-
serve to the government the authority to make these decisions; but if 
strikes were legalized, it would be difficult as a practical matter to 
confine the subjects of bargaining to the statutory boundaries. 
For these and other reasons, it is not clear that legalizing strikes 
by public employees would contribute significantly to equality of 
bargaining power in the public sector. From a strictly policy point 
of view, therefore, it would seem that substitution of a political 
process of impasse resolution for the strike weapon would move us 
closer to an orderly pattern of public sector collective bargaining. It 
remains to be seen whether the political and economic differences. 
between public and private employment are sufficient to support a 
differential treatment of the right to strike in the two sectors. 
III. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 
As discussed earlier,44 the distinction which state legislatures have 
frequently drawn between public and private employment is not 
always immediately apparent; often it is difficult to see why strikes 
should be permitted in the private sector but not in the public sec-
tor. In Rankin v. Shanker,45 the majority of the New York Court of 
Appeals distinguished public from private employment in order to 
deny a right to jury trial to public employees in a criminal contempt 
case. Judge Keating, in a strenuous dissent, emphasized the point that 
public sector strikes cannot be distinguished from private sector 
strikes solely on the basis of the essentiality of the services involved: 
When it is remembered that employees of private utilities have 
the power to plunge one of the great cities of the world into total 
darkness or complete silence, that employees of privately owned 
railroads and shipping lines have the power to deprive the residents 
of that city of vital food and fuel, that private sanitation workers, 
who carry away a substantial portion of the refuse in New York City, 
have the power to endanger the health of millions of its inhabitants 
and that thousands of other workers, carrying out activities vital to 
the life and safety of the city, may demand a trial by jury if they are 
charged with violation of a court order restraining a strike, the 
fallacy in the reasoning which would deny a jury trial to these defen-
dants is really exposed. References to the dangers to the children 
from the teachers' strike, real as those dangers may be, are not a 
substitute for a penetrating analysis of the labels "public" and "pri-
vate" employees.46 
44. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. 
45. 23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802, 295 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1968). 
46. 23 N.Y.2d at 134,242 N.E.2d at 816,295 N.Y.S.2d at 644. 
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If the distinction between public and private employment is not in 
fact legitimate, denial of the right to strike to public employees 
alone could be challenged under the equal protection clauses of the 
federal and state constitutions. However, it should be remembered 
that state legislatures have been accorded wide discretion to draft 
laws which affect one group of citizens differently than another, as 
long as the distinction is rationally related to some lawful objective.47 
And there are a number of grounds upon which public sector em-
ployment can be rationally distinguished from its private sector 
counterpart. 
The strike is, after all, an instrument for applying economic 
coercion. In the private sector, it has been an effective weapon in the 
hands of employees because employers have been constrained by the 
need to compete in a product market or else go out of business. But 
political, rather than economic, forces are the dominant constraints 
in the public sector; it is this distinguishing factor which most 
judges and commentators rely upon to justify the prohibition on 
public employee strikes. In City of New York v. DeLury,48 a case 
which upheld the ban on strikes in the Taylor Law, Chief Judge 
Fuld wrote for a unanimous New York Court of Appeals: 
[T]he necessity for preventing goods or services being priced out 
of the market may have a deterrent effect upon collective bargaining 
negotiations in the private sector, whereas, in the public sector, the 
market place has no such restraining effect upon the negotiations and 
the sole constraint in terms of the negotiations is to be found in the 
budget allocation made by responsible legislators.49 
From this, Judge Fuld reasoned that "the orderly functioning of our 
democratic form of representative government and the preservation 
of the right of our representatives to make budgetary allocations free 
... from the compulsion of crippling strikes"50 requires the prohibi-
tion of public employee work stoppages. Dr. Taylor himself stated: 
"[I]n a democratic society, consumer choice ·with respect to govern-
mental services is ultimately exercised, not in the market place, but 
in the legislative authorization of laws to be passed, taxes to be levied, 
47. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961): "The constitutional 
safeguard is offended only if the classification vests on grounds wholly irrelevant to 
the achievement of the State's objective ..•. A statutory discrimination will not be 
set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 
48. 23 N.Y.S.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128, 295 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1968), appeal dismissed, 37 
U.S.L.W. 3363 (U.S. March 31, 1969). 
49. N.Y.2d at 186, 243 N.E.2d at Hl3-34, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 909. 
50. N.Y.2d at 186, 243 N.E.2d at 134, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 909. 
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and budget expenditures to be made, and of loans to be floated. This 
is the final arbitrament of conflicts of public interest."51 
Thus, although the existence of a product market is a relevant 
consideration in private sector or public utility bargaining, political 
factors often overshadow economic considerations in public sector 
bargaining. This predominance of political over economic constraints 
will frequently lead to inefficiency or inequity in the management 
of public sector services. Reasoning by analogy, if pricing decisions 
in the private sector are separated from wage determinations, there 
is an obvious tendency toward economic irresponsibility, especially 
in those instances in which neither the price nor the wage rate is set 
by a perfectly competitive market. In a study of pricing and wage 
determination Professor John Dunlop noted: 
Governmental administrative agencies have not always been orga-
nized to recognize clearly these market relations. For example, wage-
rate decisions may be made in the railroads by emergency boards. 
Yet freight rates are decided by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. The separation of decision-making can result in a failure to 
consider the later impacts of wage changes.52 
Correspondingly, in the public sector decisions affecting the political 
"price"-or the loss to the community of one service in order to 
effectuate a settlement with employees who provide another service-
may bring about serious inequities. In a similar vein, Professor 
George Hildebrand predicts that in pure public sector wage negotia-
tions, if the employing agency has "continuing access to subsidies from 
other jurisdictions, its labor cost profile will be warped upward on 
comparative tests."53 Similarly, "[i]f a union of strategically situated 
public employees covers only a small fraction of the municipal labor 
force and is the only government union in the community, its wage 
51. The Public Interest in Collective Negotiations in Education, June 1968 (address 
delivered at University of Pennsylvania, mimeo). A joint Harvard-M.I.T. metropolitan 
study of the political economy of the New York City region noted that economic 
models were inadequate explanations for a government process in which interactions, 
"typically labelled 'transactions' " were more properly understood as political 
decisions. The study found: 
The central distinguishing feature of the governmental process is • • • its 
monopoly of the lawful means of physical violence, its possession of power-not 
just on a parcel of private property, but everywhere in the political jurisdiction. 
This quality, in and of itself, sets the political economy apart, and endows it 
with a purpose quite separate from that of the private sector. Taxes and public 
expenditures represent not just "costs" and "products" but "votes" and "in-
fluence." Political stability as much as economic prosperity is involved in the goals 
of a political economy. 
R. Woon &: V. ALMENDINGER, 1400 GOVERNMENTS, THE POLITICAL ECONOlltY OF THE 
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION 18 (1967). 
52. J. DUNLOP, WAGE DETERM:INATION UNDER TMDE UNIONS 117 (1967). 
53. Hildebrand, The Public Sector, in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 125, 15!1 
(1967). 
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profile will be warped upward on comparative tests."54 While the 
complete avoidance of these inequities and inefficiencies is impossi-
ble, it seems to me that the inequities created by strike pressures in 
the public sector are greater than those which would result from the 
recommendations or decisions of fact finders or arbitrators. I say this 
because third-party intervenors are uniquely capable of identifying 
and balancing the respective equities of the disputants. 
The Illinois Supreme Court recently advanced another possible 
distinction between private and public sector unionism: the notion 
that private parties have no right to interfere with a governmental 
function. 66 
The underlying basis for the policy against strikes by public em-
ployees is the sound and demanding notion that governmental 
functions may not be impeded or obstructed, as well as the concept 
that the profit motive, inherent in the principle of free enterprise, 
is absent in the governmental function.56 
Related to the notion that there is no right to interfere with a govern-
mental function is the concept of loyalty; both of these concepts, in 
turn, are based on the well-worn idea that public employees strikes 
constitute an intolerable interference ·with the sovereignty of the 
state. The Florida Supreme Court recently cited with favor President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous pronouncement on public employee 
strikes: " 'Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government 
by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intoler-
able.' "57 The Florida court agreed that public employee strikes can-
not be sanctioned without permitting " 'the breakdown of govern-
mental functions' " and the " 'first step toward anarchy.' "58 I do 
not accept the view, however, that any and every public employee 
strike is a first step toward anarchy. For such reasoning will result in 
the destructive confrontation described by Robben W. Fleming, 
President of the University of Michigan and a noted labor expert: 
In my judgment the danger that any strike against the government 
will undermine our democracy is counterbalanced by the equally 
dangerous contempt for the law which results from the prohibition 
of all strikes and leads to its frequent violation. If this prohibition 
continues, either it will lead to this contempt for the law, or there 
will be great public pressure for it to be applied against strike in the 
private sector as well.59 
54. Id. at 153. 
55. Board of Educ. v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965). 
56. 32 III. at 571-72, 207 N.E.2d at 430. 
57. Teachers v. Board of Public Instruction, 69 L.R.R.M. 2466, 2468 (1968). 
58. 69 L.R.R.M. at 2469. 
59. Fleming, Introduction, in FRONTIERS OF CoLI.ECTIVE BARGAINING 1, 11-12 (1967). 
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Still, some courts are likely to focus on the special duty that public 
employees are thought to owe to their government employers, par-
ticularly after two recent United States Supreme Court decisions60 
which focus upon the civil liberties of public servants. During the 
course of two different investigations, a policeman and a sanitation 
worker were asked to waive their constitutional right against self-
incrimination as a condition to retaining their government employ-
ment. The Court held unaminously in both cases that the employees 
were improperly dismissed because retention of public employment 
could not be made conditional upon a waiver of constitutional rights 
protected by the fifth and the fourteenth amendments. However, Jus-
tice Fortas, who wrote the majority opinions, limited the holdings to 
an actual waiver of constitutionally protected rights; he stated in 
dictum that absent the demand for waiver, a municipality could insist 
that an employee testify in matters relating to his official duties as a 
condition to retaining employment. Justice Fortas wrote, in part: 
Unlike the lawyer, [the policeman] is directly, immediately, and en-
tirely responsible to the city or State which is his employer. He owes 
his entire loyalty to it. He has no other "client" or principal. He is 
a trustee of the public interest, bearing the burden of great and total 
responsibility to his public employer.61 
It remains to be seen whether the broad language of these two civil 
liberties cases will ultimately be applied to public sector collective 
action. It seems doubtful that the test of "loyalty" used by Justice 
Fortas in reference to policemen will be applied with equal force 
to the majority of governmental employees, particularly those such 
as park attendants or meter maids whose services are neither critical 
nor traditionally or necessarily unique to government. 
In a sense, all of the previous discussion has been prefatory. I 
have attempted, as have others in this Symposium, to present the 
theoretical and practical arguments that are bedrock in any discussion 
of collective bargaining for government employees. The remainder 
of this Article will be devoted to an examination of the various 
schemes that have been designed to cope with the situations in 
which collective bargaining in the public sector fails to yield a ne-
gotiated settlement. 
IV. IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
A. The Foreign Experience 
In order to place our recent experience with trade union mili-
tancy in public employment into perspective, it is helpful to consider 
60. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Uniformed Sanitation Men Assoc., 
Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 390 U.S. 280 (1968). 
61. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. at 277-78 (emphasis added). 
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the more peaceful relations of governments and employees in other 
countries where collective bargaining has long been accepted in 
public employment. The foreign experience is a particularly relevant 
consideration since it is often used as a justification for extending the 
right to strike to the public sector. 
I. The Canadian Public Service 
As Professor Harry Arthurs points out in this Symposium, 62 the 
Canadian federal experience, although not a panacea, is extremely 
hopeful in many respects. Under the new federal Act,63 employee 
organizations in the Canadian Public Service are free to choose in 
advance whether they prefer the right to strike or compulsory arbitra-
tion as a means of dispute resolution. However, the public employer 
may exclude certain industries from the strike-rights provisions or 
demand that certain employees within a unit give up the right to 
strike on the ground that the service affects the public safety and 
security.64 The President of the Canadian Treasury Board recently 
stated: 
Experience so far suggests that in a unit governed by the option for 
binding arbitration, the pressures to find a mutually satisfactory 
settlement are just as strong as they are in one where the conciliation 
strike route has been chosen. There is certainly nothing to support 
the oft-expressed view that effective bargaining is impossible when 
arbitration lies at the end of the road.65 
Even more significant, not one dispute has been submitted to arbitra-
tion since the Act became effective toward the end of October last 
year.66 
2. British Experience 
Some commentators take the position that British public em-
ployees have the same immunities for concerted action during the 
course of a labor dispute that private sector employees have67 under 
the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.68 Although it is true that the Trade 
Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 194669 repealed the criminal 
sanctions imposed by the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 
62. See Arthurs, supra note 23, at 990. 
63. Public Service Staff Relations Act, c. 72, §§ 36, 59, [1966-67] Can. Stat. 
64. Public Service Staff Relations Act, c. 72, § l0l(l)(c), [1966-67] Can. Stat. 
65. Address by C. N. Drury, Joint Conference on Collective Bargaining in Federal 
Public Service, at Niagara Falls, Nov. 20, 1968, reproduced in GERR No. 282, G-1, at 
G-4. 
66. GERR No. 282, at G-4. 
67. It may also be argued that Canadian public employees have traditionally en-
joyed the right to strike even in the absence of specific legislative authorization. See 
Arthurs, supra note 23, at 987. 
68. 6 Edw. 7, c.47. 
69. 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c.52. 
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192770 against striking public employees, many statutory and com-
mon-law restrictions remain on public employee strikes in Great 
Britain. Generally, civil servants in the United Kingdom do not work 
under a contract of service. As a matter of common law, they are 
servants of the Queen and hold their appointments "at the will and 
pleasure of the Crown."71 With the exception of one major postal 
strike in 1964, there have been only token strikes and work-to-rule 
campaigns in the British civil service. In those few cases, little 
disciplinary action was taken, but it is widely assumed by civil ser-
vants "that if they struck the Government might retaliate by with-
drawing or reducing pensions."72 Moreover, civil service trade unions 
do not believe in the use of the strike weapon. The ability of these 
unions to sustain a strike would be severely limited in any event by 
their small union treasuries, and British civil servants are not gen-
erally willing to pay higher dues. But, the most significant deterrent 
against public employee strikes was the clear threat of reprisals against 
striking workers that accompanied the repeal in 1946 of the broad 
criminal sanctions of the 1927 Act. When the Attorney General 
moved for the second reading of the 1946 Trade Disputes and Trade 
Unions bill, he stated in part: 
The 1927 Act did not forbid civil servants (directly) to strike, and 
nothing that we propose to do now will make it any more legal than 
it is today for civil servants to take strike action .... Government, 
like any government as employer, would feel itself perfectly free to 
take any disciplinary action that any strike situation that might 
develop demanded.1s 
Today, various criminal sanctions and governmental rights of 
seizure limit public employee strikes in England. Under section 4 
of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875,74 an em-
ployee in a gas or water (and since 1919, electricity) works commits 
a crime if he "wilfully and maliciously breaks a contract of ser-
vice . . . knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
probable consequence of his so doing, either alone or in combination 
with others will be to deprive the inhabitants of that city, borough, 
town, place or part wholly or to a great extent of their supply."75 In 
addition, the government has broad powers to break strikes under 
70. 17 &: 18 Geo. 5, c.22. 
71. F. SCHMIDT&: M. SoMERHAUSEN, NEGOTIATING RIGHTS IN THE PUBUC SERVICE AND 
THE RIGHT To STRIKE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 94 (1966). 
72. Id. at 95. 
73. Id. at 94. 
74. 38 &: 39 Viet., c.86. 
75. 38 &: 39 Viet., c.86, § 4. 
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the Emergency Powers Act of 1920.76 Professor K. W. Wedderburn 
notes that British post office workers may be subject to criminal 
prosecution during the course of a trade dispute under the Post 
Office Act of 1953.77 The statute is broad enough to cover any slow-
down or stoppage.78 In addition, section 3 of the Police Act of 191979 
established a "house union" and made it a crime to do "any act cal-
culated to cause disaffection . . . or to induce any member of the 
Police Force to withold his service or to commit breaches of disci-
pline .... [Such act shall make the actor] liable to imprisonment for 
two years or fine of fifty pounds."8° Finally, there is considerable 
doubt that the immunities granted to trade unions in civil actions by 
the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 bind the Crown at all, "since the 
Crown is not expressly named therein and there would appear to be 
no necessary implication that the Crown is bound."81 
Thus, the fairly peaceful record in the United Kingdom in public 
employment cannot be attributed to a lack of civil, criminal, and 
disciplinary weapons available to public prosecutors and government 
agencies. Rather, it would seem that labor peace in public em-
ployment may be the result of the availability of compulsory arbi-
tration. For example, the police, utility workers, and workers in 
nationalized industries may refer disputes to industry and national 
Whitley Councils--tripartite dispute settlement boards. Most na-
tional civil servants, including white collar workers, also have the 
benefit of Whitley Councils. Moreover, employees may resort to the 
Civil Service Pay Research Unit, a national fact-finding board that 
determines "analogues" for each class of "nonindustrial" civil ser-
vant. The determinations of the Unit become the basis for negotia-
tions in Whitley Councils, and arbitration is ultimately available in 
the event of disagreement.82 However, the existence of strong penalty 
provisions should not be discounted. 
3. The Swedish Experience 
A valid comparison of Swedish labor relations with our mvn re-
quires an appreciation of the very different role that the national 
union confederations in Sweden play in formulating government 
76. 10 &: 11 Geo. 5, c.55. 
77. l &: 2 Eliz. 2, c.36. 
78. l &: 2 Eliz. 2, c.36, §§ 58-59. 
79. 9 &: 10 Geo. 5, c.45. 
80. 9 &: 10 Geo. 5, c.45, § 3. 
81. REPORT OF TIIE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMl'LOYERS' AssoCIA-
TIONS 1965-1968, at 236 (1968), 
82. Id. at 34. 
964 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67:94!1 
policy and in controlling member unions. In Sweden, a Civil Service 
Committee, designed to prevent labor disputes in the state service 
where a strike could be harmful to the community, consists of four 
members appointed by the state and four members appointed by the 
primary labor organizations. Either party to a dispute may submit an 
issue to the committee; although its judgment is not binding, "be-
cause of the authority which the committee enjoys and the high level 
it represents, its pronouncements exert a strong pressure in prac-
tice."83 In the final instance, the government can intervene in a dis-
pute by introducing compulsory legislation. 
In the case of municipal workers, the Federation of Municipal 
Authorities and the municipal employee organizations have agreed 
upon similiar procedures since January 1966. In addition, a local 
government can invoke the services of a joint labor-management 
committee in a labor dispute that affects services of vital importance 
to the community. In practice, because of the pervading power of the 
national labor movement, a strike must be approved on a national 
level before the movement will allow the use of coercive force in the 
public or private sector. No such procedures or traditions exist in 
the United States. 
B. Structured Dispute Resolution in the United States 
As pointed out above,84 collective bargaining has been singularly 
effective in public employment in this country even without the 
right to strike. The record of dispute resolution in New York City, 
New York State, Michigan, Wisconsin, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and other jurisdictions which have adopted collective bargaining laws 
is impressive. There is evidence that the process of fact-finding with 
recommendations, used in all the jurisdictions cited, has not had the 
deadening effect on collective bargaining which some observers ex-
pected. (As used herein, the term "fact-finding" includes impartial 
recommendations, advisory arbitration awards, and fact finders' 
reports and recommendations.) Instead, it has proved to be an effec-
tive means of resolving public employee disputes without strikes. 
In New York City, the Office of Collective Bargaining coordinates 
the labor relations activities of municipal agencies and such other 
public employers who, with the mayor's approval, elect to use its 
procedures. 85 The Office is charged with the responsibility of imple-
menting a three-part procedure of impasse resolution consisting of 
83. F. SCHMIDT & M. SoMERHAUSEN, supra note 71, at 109. 
84. See notes 19-44 supra and accompanying text. 
85. N.Y. CITY ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, Local Law 53 § 1173-3.0(g), reproduced in GERR 
No. 205, at E-3. 
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mediation, fact-finding, and, ultimately, public recommendations 
for settlement. 
It would be a mistake to ascribe the success of public sector 
collective bargaining to the single procedure of fact-finding with 
recommendations. The majority of contract disputes are settled by 
the direct bargaining of the parties. Moreover, inherent in the con-
cept of advisory recommendations-at least in New York City-is 
the possibility that a given dispute might be referred to mediation or 
to binding arbitration. Indeed, the disputing parties may call upon 
the same panel that conducts mediation to arbitrate a particular is-
sue; on other occasions a public board may ask the mediation panel 
to make advisory recommendations as to issues that the parties will 
not refer to arbitration. The panel may actually engage in all three 
processes under the general heading of fact-finding. For example, in 
the one year during which the New York City Office of Collective Bar-
gaining has been in operation, the twenty-three impasse cases closed 
by the Office were disposed of as follows: 86 thirteen cases were settled 
by report and recommendations of a panel, accepted by the parties; 
three cases were settled when the parties reached agreement before 
the panel operated; one case was diverted to arbitration as a griev-
ance under contract; three cases were diverted to, and settled by, 
mediation; nvo cases were diverted to the Board of Collective Bar-
gaining for binding determinations;87 and one case was not within 
the jurisdiction of the Office. In only nvo cases during 1968 did one 
party initially reject a fact finder's report and recommendations. In 
both cases, the union rejected the findings, but in neither case did a 
strike result; moreover, the unions involved subsequently reconsid-
ered their position and accepted the recommendations.88 The record 
of closed impasse cases during 1968 is significant because it shows the 
86. New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, First Annual Report (to be pub• 
lished in May 1969). 
87. Id. In one of these two cases, the scope of bargaining and the scope of an 
impasse panel's possible recommendations was settled; in the other case, the Borg-
Warner limitations on bargaining to impasse were held to apply to negotiations within 
the jurisdiction of the Office's procedures. 
88. Similar patterns of successful prior mediation and reference to arbitration have 
been observed in other jurisdictions. The combined data compiled by Edward Krinsky 
of the Research Staff of the University of Wisconsin Department of Labor Relations 
for the states of 'Wisconsin, New York, Connecticut, Michigan, and Massachusetts 
show that between sixty and eighty per cent of mediation cases were resolved 
without resort to fact-finding; approximately fifty per cent of the cases in which fact-
finding was initiated were settled prior to the issuance of recommendations. Krinsky 
also found that in the great majority of completed fact-finding cases, work stoppages 
have been avoided and the recommendations accepted. Data supplied by E. Krinsky 
from an unpublished and incomplete Doctoral Thesis on Fact-Finding in Public 
Employment, February 1969 (University of Wisconsin). 
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interrelationship of the various procedures available and the flexi-
bility of the permanent machinery which has been established.89 
The nature of the fact-finding process itself perhaps explains the 
variety and flexibility of impasse resolution procedures which have 
been observed in jurisdictions such as New York City. The fact 
finder typically collects evidence in a quasijudicial hearing in order 
to examine critically the merits of a given dispute. With this infor-
mation in hand, he may make a report to a political authority, rec-
ommend a settlement to the parties, or make a public recommenda-
tion designed to bring the pressure of public opinion to bear on an 
intransigent party. Fact-finding has been described as a "logical ex-
tension of collective bargaining because it continuously keeps open 
the possibility of voluntary settlement."90 It is this possibility of 
voluntary settlement throughout the process that distinguishes fact-
finding from compulsory arbitration.91 Theodore Kheel noted an-
other important distinction between arbitration and fact-finding in 
his report to the speaker of the New York State Assembly.92 Mr. 
!{heel correctly pointed out that even practitioners of both processes 
often confuse arbitration and fact-finding. Fact-finding success, he 
insisted, is measured by "the acceptability of recommendations," 
whereas arbitration measures the "equity of the claims."93 
Arbitration and fact-finding may, however, converge at a number 
of points: the nature of the investigation, the scope of the parties' sub-
missions or stipulations, the language of written decisions, and even 
the unstated criteria are often the same or similar. This may be the re-
sult of what Kheel calls practitioner's confusion. It may also reflect the 
89. It should be noted that under the Taylor Law, as revised on March 4, 1969, by 
S. 5008 and A. 6704 (effective April I, 1969), final resolution of disputes is committed 
to the appropriate legislative body. Specifically, the amended version of the statute 
provides that 
the legislative body or a duly authorized committee thereof shall forthwith con-
duct a hearing [if a fact finders' report and recommendations is not accepted] 
at which the parties shall be required to explain their positions with respect to 
the report of the fact-finding board; and (iv) thereafter, the legislative body shall 
take such action as it deems to be in the public interest, including the interest 
of the public employees involved. 
Law of March 4, 1969, § 209(3)(e), GERR: No. 288, at F-1, F-5, amending N.Y. CIV. 
SER. LAw § 209(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
90. Hildebrand, The Neutral in Public Employment Disputes, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 287, 292 (1967). 
91. A recently proposed Taylor Law amendment that would make fact-finding 
binding would, according to its proponents, "achieve the benefits of arbitration but avoid 
the rigid patterns which compulsory arbitration invariably imposes. In addition it 
should tend to motivate both parties to more effective and realistic good faith negotia-
tion and earlier achievement of agreement." Hearings on the Taylor Law Before the 
Joint Legislative Comm. on Indus. and Labor Conditions (unpublished, Dec. 1968) 
(statement of R. Rowley), reproduced in GERR No. 277, at B-1. 
92. Kheel, Report, supra note 27, at 14. 
93. Id. at 33. 
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fact that practitioners tend to shape a new process like fact-finding; 
if they are professional arbitrators, it may be difficult for them to 
abandon their firm commitment to equitable notions. Indeed, it 
may not be desirable for them to do so as long as they firmly believe 
that the fact-finding process works because th~ parties respond to 
equitable recommendations. It is clear that an arbitrator is in one 
respect a fact finder: "arbitration is in itself unique because it nor-
mally concentrates in the arbitrator the primary function of fact-
finding, which is performed by the trial court, and the secondary 
function of review, which is confided in the intermediary and final 
appellate court system."94 It is also common that fact finders are con-
strained by the parties' submission agreement from making an inde-
pendent investigation to uncover relevant facts and must rely upon 
briefs and evidence submitted during the hearing. 
Fact-finding should be seen as an occasional extension of bar-
gaining or as an adjunct to bargaining-a process that is valuable 
because it presents carefully framed terms of agreement that are 
closely related to the prior bargaining of the parties. These terms of 
agreement are likely to be "acceptable" because they are couched 
in the realm of the reasonable-if not equitable-expectations of 
the parties. Recommendations will be all the more acceptable if the 
fact finder identifies the issues in full view of the public and the 
union's rank and file. If one disputing party's miscalculation as to 
reasonable expectations of the other party is a common cause of 
strikes-and at least one noted economist thinks that it is95-then a 
process that apprises the parties of what is realistically possible within 
a particular bargaining history and in a particular labor market is a 
process premised on persuasion and voluntary agreement rather than 
adjudication. 
The substitution of fact-finding with recommendations for the 
strike weapon is not advanced as a panacea for dispute resolution; 
there are no such easy answers. I simply feel that fact-finding is pre-
ferable to legalizing public employee strikes because of the flexibility 
and equity it affords in dispute resolution. Recent experience shows 
that the majority of public employee disputes are settled short of rec-
ommendations by mediators, that the great majority of recommenda-
tions have been accepted, and that the problems posed by rejection 
of recommendations are not peculiar to the process of fact-finding. 
94. Tobriner, An Appellate Judge's View of the Labor Arbitration Process: Due 
Process and the Arbitration Process, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING, 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF .ARBITRATORS 37, 38 (1967). 
95. L. Rl::YNOLDS, LA!IOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 280-82 (3d ed. 1959). 
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Thus, if fact-finding with recommendations is properly utilized, col-
lective bargaining in the public sector can be effective without the 
right to strike. 
Of course, the courts must also be an essential part of any process 
that looks toward voluntary settlement of labor disputes in public 
employment. The nature of labor relations in the public as well as 
in the private sector calls for mature consideration of the equities 
on both sides of a labor dispute. What we need is an adaptation of 
the "clean hands" doctrine of the Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction 
statute;96 under that provision, restraining orders in labor disputes 
were conditioned upon the conduct of the parties. The Michigan 
Supreme Court essentially adopted this approach in a case involving 
the Holland Education Association.97 There, the court in effect 
recognized a limited right to strike even though the Michigan 
Public Employment Relations Act prohibited strikes in the public 
sector. The Michigan court, having considered the conduct of the 
employer during bargaining, found that there was no basis for an 
automatic injunction against a teacher walkout. New York's Taylor 
Law similarly recognizes the possibility that a strike may have been 
caused by acts of extreme provocation on the part of the public em-
ployer; this would tend to diminish the responsibility of a labor 
organization for a resultant strike.98 Nevertheless, in the Huntington, 
Long Island, teachers' case, the PERB trial examiner found that the 
school board's rejection of a fact finder's recommendations for the 
96. 29 u.s.c. §§ 104, 107 (1964). 
97. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). 
98. At Section 210(3)(e) the Taylor Law clearly states: 
In determining whether an employee organization has violated subdivision one 
of this section ["No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a 
strike, and no employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or con-
done a strike.'1, the board shall consider (i) whether the employee organization 
called the strike or tried to prevent it, (ii) whether the employee organization 
made or was making good faith efforts to terminate the strike, and (iii) whether, 
if so alleged by the employee organization, the public employer or its representa-
tives engaged in such acts of extreme provocation as to detract from the responsi-
bility of the employee organization for the strike. 
One commentator has written that the "language of the Act clearly states that 
these inquiries go to the substantive question of whether Section 210 was violated.'' 
Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION AND 
BARGAINING! A REPORT ON THE JOINT CONFERENCE OF TiiE ASSOCIATION OF LABOR MEDIA· 
TION AGENCIES AND 11iE NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF STA'IE LABOR RELATIONS AGENCIES 29, 
33 (1968). But two of the three PERB members insist that the language goes only 
to mitigation of the penalty and the Taylor Committee in their Interim Report has 
taken the same position. Since the Act was amended on March 4, 1969, it is now clear 
that the employer's acts of "extreme provocation" are relevant only to the fixing of 
penalties. Such acts may not be considered in determining whether employees have in 
fact engaged in a strike or other prohibited concerted activity. Law of March 4, 1969, 
§ 2l0(3)(f), GERR No. 288, at F-1, F-7, amending N.Y. Cxv. SERV. LAw § 210(!l)(f) 
(McKinney Supp. 1968). 
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settlement of the dispute did not constitute such an act of extreme 
provocation as to justify the strike.99 The decision brought sharp 
criticism of the Taylor Law by the National Education Associa-
tion.100 Nevertheless, the principle of establishing rules of fair con-
duct-whether they are called unfair labor practices or some other 
name-seems to be an appropriate one to append to state laws which 
ban or otherwise limit the right to strike. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The public must realize that there can be no absolute guarantee 
against strikes in a free society; that result is possible only in a police 
state. If the prevailing no-strike policy is to be maintained, it must 
be demonstrated that on balance the interest of public employees 
and the general community will be better served by a process of 
political collective bargaining based upon recommendations or upon 
voluntary or binding arbitration rather than upon the economic 
coercion of a strike. 
It is my view that collective bargaining and impasse reso-
lution procedures can work and have worked effectively in public 
employment without the right to strike. Moreover, I would agree 
with Professor Russell Smith, who recently argued that the current 
political climate is not receptive to the qualified right to strike for 
public employees. Professor Smith suggested 
that serious thought should be given to Ted Kheel's ... suggestions, 
accepted in principle, by the Pennsylvania Committee . . . that the 
right to strike, except for certain categories of public employees, 
should be recognized, subject to handling really critical adverse 
effects on an ad hoc basis as they arise. But the public is probably 
not ready for this. I guess I continue to subscribe to the view we took 
in Michigan in our report to Governor Romney which would con-
tinue the strike ban and, ultimately, leave the use of the injunction 
contingent upon relevant inquiry by the court into the circum-
stances including, obviously, the degree of adverse impact on the 
public.101 
It is my own conclusion, then, that the sounder public policy is to 
continue the strike ban, but allow the courts and labor boards dis-
99. In re Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., Case No. D-0003 (Aug. 9, 1968) 
(Report and Recommendations of Board Member and Hearing Officer George H. 
Fowler). 
100. Hearings, supra note 91. 
101. Unfair Labor Practices in Public Employment, GERR No. 268, at E-1, E-9 
(Oct. 28, 1968). 
970 Michigan Law Review 
cretion to fashion remedies for violations. Ultimately, the state legis-
latures or the Congress will make the political judgment as to 
whether the strike prohibition in public employment is a realistic 
and equitable public policy or whether it must give way to a limited 
and qualified right to strike. 
